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OPINION 
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SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 “A waived claim or defense is one that a party has 
knowingly and intelligently relinquished.”  Wood v. Milyard, 
132 S. Ct. 1826, 1832 n.4 (2012).  How, then, can a party 
waive a right “in a situation in which no right existed[?]”  
Ackerberg v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1989).  
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The answer is: it cannot.  Every circuit to have answered this 
question has held that “a litigant [need not] engage in futile 
gestures merely to avoid a claim of waiver.”  Miller v. Drexel 
Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 850, 854 (11th Cir. 1986), 
abrogated on other grounds by  Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. 
v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988).  We too adopt this 
position and therefore hold that futility can excuse the 
delayed invocation of the right to compel arbitration.  
Because we also conclude that any attempt to compel bipolar 
– that is, individual – arbitration in this case prior to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), would have been futile, we 
will remand with instructions that the District Court compel 
bipolar arbitration of all Plaintiffs’ arbitrable claims in 
accordance with its May 14, 2015, order and this opinion. 
I. 
 Plaintiffs represent a putative class of New Jersey real 
estate purchasers and refinancers who were overcharged 
between $70 and $350 in fees stemming from the recording 
of their deeds and mortgage instruments.  Plaintiffs allege that 
the settlement agents – title agents and attorneys who were, in 
turn, agents of the Defendants – intentionally charged 
Plaintiffs more than the county clerk charged for recording 
these documents and pocketed the difference.  Plaintiffs 
further allege that the class claims add up to over $50 million, 
exclusive of treble damages and interest. 
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 On January 22, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey alleging 
both breach of contract and violation of New Jersey law.  In 
response, Defendants sought to dismiss a number of these 
claims and raised several affirmative defenses.  They did not, 
however, seek to compel arbitration based on the arbitration 
clauses present in their contracts with Plaintiffs.1  While no 
explanation for this inaction was given, we conclude infra 
that an attempt to compel bipolar arbitration would have been 
futile under prevailing New Jersey law.  Because arbitration 
was not sought, the case was litigated for two and a half years 
with the focus primarily on class certification.  In that time, 
both sides conducted broad discovery and contested several 
substantive motions on their merits.  Plaintiffs have also 
extensively documented their efforts in this case and note that 
they served over 130 non-party subpoenas and spent over 
$50,000 on experts before Defendants sought bipolar 
arbitration.   
 However, on April 27, 2011, the Supreme Court in 
Concepcion held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
preempted state laws that had previously prohibited a party 
from compelling bipolar arbitration in certain situations even 
when it was specifically agreed to by contract.  563 U.S. at 
                                                 
1 There are two arbitration clauses at issue here; some 
putative class members have claims under the 1987 Owner’s 
Policy while others have claims under the 1992 Loan Policy.  
For purposes of this analysis, the minor differences between 
the two are immaterial. 
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352.2  Sensing an opportunity to ward off this potential class 
action, Defendants sent a letter to Plaintiffs on June 8, 2011, 
demanding enforcement of the arbitration agreements in light 
of this change in the law.3  Plaintiffs rejected this arbitration 
demand and noted that the question of arbitration “might have 
been an interesting issue had you thought of it two and a half 
years ago when the case was filed . . . .”  JA 816.  Defendants 
then filed a motion in the District Court to compel bipolar 
arbitration on August 1, 2011.  The District Court concluded 
                                                 
2 It cannot be disputed that Concepcion marked a change in 
our jurisprudence.  See Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 
225, 230 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The specific question before us 
remains whether the FAA preempts the New Jersey Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Muhammad.  As noted above, we had 
previously held that, pursuant to Homa, it did not.  We now 
examine that decision anew and hold that Homa has been 
abrogated by Concepcion and that Muhammad is preempted 
by the FAA.”). 
3 The dissent characterizes Defendants’ “about-face” as a 
“litigation tactic [intended] to derail the court proceedings.”  
Such a characterization would seem to apply regardless of 
when Defendants moved for arbitration, as arbitration by 
definition derails court proceedings.  In addition, deciding 
whether to invoke an arbitration clause is certainly a litigation 
“tactic,” but tactical decision making alone does not counsel 
against enforcement of a valid arbitration agreement.  Indeed, 
this general disapproval of arbitration clauses has been 
roundly rejected by the Supreme Court.  Concepcion, 563 
U.S. at 339 (explaining that the FAA reflects a “liberal 
federal policy favoring arbitration.”). 
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that any attempt to compel bipolar arbitration prior to 
Concepcion would have been futile.  Accordingly, the District 
Court granted the motion, stayed the case, and ordered bipolar 
arbitration. 
 This decision, however, led to a barrage of motions for 
reconsideration that, as the District Court observed, “has 
come to resemble a ping pong match between the parties.”  
JA 42.  Ultimately, the District Court conducted an 
evidentiary hearing and found that all but two Plaintiffs had 
agreed to bipolar arbitration.  Accordingly, over Plaintiffs’ 
strong protest, it again compelled bipolar arbitration of the 
remaining claims. 
 Three issues relating to this ruling were certified for 
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b): 
(a) Whether the [District] Court’s decision to 
allow Defendants to assert the affirmative 
defense of arbitration due to a change in law 
even though a substantial period of time elapsed 
between [D]efendant[s’] answer and filing of 
the motion to assert the defense was in error; (b) 
Whether Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants 
alleging a violation of the New Jersey 
Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. §§ 56:8-1 et 
seq., are barred; and (c) any other issues arising 
out of the District Court’s decision concerning 
the arbitration of the claims.   
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JA 195-96 (internal citations omitted).  Because we conclude 
that the District Court did not err in compelling bipolar 
arbitration, we need not address any other issues on appeal.4 
II. 
 We first consider whether, as an abstract matter, the 
futility of raising bipolar arbitration as a defense should 
excuse the delay in doing so.  Generally, “[a] written 
provision in any . . . contract . . . to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be 
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds 
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2.  The Supreme Court 
has stated that this provision reflects a “‘liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration.’”  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339 (quoting 
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 
U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).  Thus “any doubts concerning the scope of 
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, 
whether the problem at hand is the construction of the 
contract language itself or any allegation of waiver, delay, or 
a like defense to arbitrability.”  Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 
24-25; see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989) (“There is 
no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of 
                                                 
4 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(2) and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b).   
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procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the 
enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements 
to arbitrate.”).  Given this strong preference to enforce 
arbitration agreements, we have concluded that a party waives 
the right to arbitrate “only where the demand for arbitration 
came long after the suit commenced and when both parties 
had engaged in extensive discovery.”  PaineWebber Inc. v. 
Faragalli, 61 F.3d 1063, 1068-69 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 For example, in Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., we 
held that a defendant seeking to compel arbitration may waive 
the right to do so when the plaintiff demonstrates unfair 
prejudice arising from the defendant’s delay in raising 
arbitration as an affirmative defense.  482 F.3d 207, 223 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  To guide this prejudice inquiry, in Hoxworth v. 
Blinder, Robinson & Co. we identified six nonexclusive 
factors that courts should consider when determining if the 
defense of arbitration has been waived: (1) the timeliness or 
lack thereof of the motion to arbitrate; (2) the extent to which 
the party seeking arbitration has contested the merits of the 
opposing party’s claims; (3) whether the party seeking 
arbitration informed its adversary of its intent to pursue 
arbitration prior to seeking to enjoin the court proceedings; 
(4) the extent to which the party seeking arbitration engaged 
in non-merits motion practice; (5) the party’s acquiescence to 
the court’s pretrial orders; and (6) the extent to which the 
parties have engaged in discovery.  980 F.2d 912, 926-27 (3d 
Cir. 1992). 
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 None of these cases, however, dealt with a situation in 
which the prejudicial delay occurred solely because an 
attempt to raise the defense of arbitration earlier would have 
been futile.  Accordingly, we believe that our analysis in a 
futility case cannot rely solely on Hoxworth because there, 
waiver was premised on the fact that the right in question 
indisputably existed and could have been raised earlier.  
Wood, 132 S. Ct. at 1832 (defining waiver as the known 
relinquishment of a claim or defense).  It makes no sense to 
consider, for example, whether a party “assent[ed] to the 
district court’s pretrial orders,” Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 927, 
when, at the time the orders were issued, the party had no 
grounds on which it could plausibly contest them.  In other 
words, Hoxworth was simply not a futility case.  Thus, its list 
of factors for determining prejudice is ill suited for our 
analysis here. 
 Accordingly, we must look beyond Hoxworth to 
determine whether and when futility can excuse the delayed 
invocation of an arbitration clause as an affirmative defense.  
In so doing, we identify three primary reasons why we 
believe that adoption of the futility exception in this context is 
appropriate. 
 First, we believe that in the arbitration context, the 
logic of our waiver analysis – in addition to its specific 
factors – is undercut to the extent that the delay we are 
considering was the result of futility.  This suggests to us that 
the standard waiver analysis should not apply in the futility 
context.  Cf. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25 (“[A]ny 
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doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be 
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand 
is the construction of the contract language itself or any 
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to 
arbitrability.”).  As we noted in Hoxworth, “‘where a party 
fails to demand arbitration during pretrial proceedings, and, in 
the meantime, engages in pretrial activity inconsistent with an 
intent to arbitrate, the party later opposing a motion to compel 
arbitration may more easily show that its position has been 
compromised, i.e., prejudiced.’”  980 F.2d at 926 (quoting 
Price v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 1156, 1161 
(5th Cir. 1986)).  In other words, one of the primary 
justifications for waiver is that the party attempting to raise it 
as a belated defense acted inconsistently with his earlier 
known right to do so.  However, if an earlier attempt to assert 
the defense of arbitration would have been futile, this failure 
to take a futile action is not inconsistent with that defense.  
See Fisher, 791 F.2d at 697 (“[T]he Fishers have failed to 
demonstrate that Becker acted inconsistently with a known 
existing right to compel arbitration.”).  Thus, applicability of 
the standard waiver analysis seems to miss the key fact that 
while there may be some prejudice resulting from the delay in 
raising a particular defense, that prejudice is attributable to a 
change in the applicable law, not to any negligent action on 
the part of either party. 
 Second, we have recognized futility as an exception to 
both ripeness and administrative exhaustion.  See Sammon v. 
N. J. Bd. of Med. Examiners, 66 F.3d 639, 641 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(engaging in a “futile gesture to establish ripeness” would be 
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unnecessary); Berger v. Edgewater Steel Co., 911 F.2d 911, 
916 (3d Cir. 1990) (“Although the exhaustion requirement is 
strictly enforced, courts have recognized an  exception when 
resort to the administrative process would be futile.”); 
Harrow v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 279 F.3d 244, 249 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (“A plaintiff is excused from exhausting 
administrative procedures under ERISA if it would be futile 
to do so.”).  We see no reason why this logic would not 
extend to the case at hand.  Why would we require a party to 
make a “futile gesture” to prevent waiver when we do not 
require such gestures in other scenarios? 
 Finally, as Plaintiffs’ admitted at oral argument, all 
four circuits to have considered this issue have undertaken 
similar analyses and come to the same conclusion.  Fisher v. 
A.G. Becker Paribas Inc., 791 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(“Until the Supreme Court’s decision in Byrd, the arbitration 
agreement in this case was unenforceable.  Therefore, the 
Fishers have failed to demonstrate that Becker acted 
inconsistently with a known existing right to compel 
arbitration.”); Miller, 791 F.2d at 854 (“This circuit does not 
require a litigant to engage in futile gestures merely to avoid a 
claim of waiver.  Thus, appellees’ failure to request 
arbitration prior to the Byrd decision is irrelevant to the issue 
of waiver.”); Peterson v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 849 F.2d 
464, 466 (10th Cir. 1988) (“There was no requirement that 
Shearson make a futile attempt to obtain arbitration on the 
federal claim given the state of the law; indeed, it would be 
difficult to argue that such an attempt had a basis in existing 
law.”); Ackerberg, 892 F.2d at 1333 (“[W]e cannot find 
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waiver, the voluntary relinquishment of a known right, in a 
situation in which no right existed.  . . .  To find that the [] 
defendants waived a right they did not have . . . is not only 
illogical, but also would encourage litigants, in order to avoid 
a finding of waiver, to file motions they knew to be futile.”).  
We therefore hold that futility can excuse the delayed 
invocation of the defense of arbitration. 
III. 
 We  next look at the futility exception in the context of 
this case.  To do this, we first consider the existing bipolar 
and class arbitration case law and conclude that courts have 
typically treated each form of arbitration as substantively 
distinct.  We therefore conclude that each can be 
independently waived, thereby requiring that each receive a 
separate futility analysis.  We next ask what it means for the 
assertion of a right to have been futile, concluding that the 
appropriate test is whether assertion of that right was almost 
certain to fail.  Finally, we apply this framework and hold that 
here, a motion to compel bipolar arbitration prior to 
Concepcion was almost certain to fail. 
A. 
 Plaintiffs contend that it would not have been futile for 
Defendants to have moved to enforce the arbitration clauses 
prior to Concepcion.  Defendants, however, assert that this is 
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not the proper question.  Instead, they suggest that the real 
question is whether they could have compelled bipolar 
arbitration prior to Concepcion.5  We agree with Defendants 
that the latter question is the proper inquiry, largely because 
profound differences distinguish class and bipolar arbitration.  
Cf. David S. Clancy, Matthew M.K. Stein, An Uninvited 
Guest: Class Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act’s 
Legislative History, 63 Bus. Law. 55, 62 (2007) (“Class 
arbitration is very different from the arbitration contemplated 
by Congress when Congress passed the FAA, and it is 
different in ways that plainly matter: its characteristics are the 
opposite of those that impressed Congress about 
arbitration.”).  In Opalinski v. Robert Half International, Inc., 
we undertook a thorough review of Supreme Court and Third 
Circuit cases dealing with class and bipolar arbitration.  761 
F.3d 326 (3d Cir. 2014).  In doing so, we concluded that 
bipolar and class arbitration are distinct at a fundamental, 
substantive level.  They are thus not merely different 
adjudicative procedures that are easily interchanged: 
[W]e read the Supreme Court as characterizing 
the permissibility of classwide arbitration not 
solely as a question of procedure or contract 
interpretation but as a substantive gateway 
                                                 
5 Indeed, Plaintiffs acknowledge that “Defendants have not 
sought arbitration other than on an individual basis” and at 
one point in this litigation argued that the motion to compel 
such arbitration should be denied because it would not allow 
for class arbitration.  ECF No. 221 at * 40. 
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dispute qualitatively separate from deciding an 
individual quarrel.  Traditional individual 
arbitration and class arbitration are so distinct 
that a choice between the two goes, we believe, 
to the very type of controversy to be resolved. 
Id. at 334.  Indeed, we further noted that “[t]he [Supreme] 
Court’s line of post-Bazzle opinions . . . indicates that, 
because of the fundamental differences between classwide 
and bilateral arbitration, and the consequences of proceeding 
with one rather than the other, the availability of classwide 
arbitrability is a substantive gateway question . . . .”  Id. at 
335 (discussing Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 
444, 459 (2003)).  Accordingly, we held that – absent clear 
and unmistakable evidence of agreement to the contrary – the 
court, not the arbitrator, must decide whether a contract 
permits either bipolar or class arbitration.  Id. at 330, 335.
 Indeed, the Supreme Court in Concepcion also 
highlighted three reasons why class arbitration is 
fundamentally different from bipolar arbitration.  “First, the 
switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices the 
principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and 
makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to 
generate procedural morass than final judgment.”  563 U.S. at 
348.  “Second, class arbitration requires procedural formality.  
The AAA’s rules governing class arbitrations mimic the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for class litigation.”  Id. at 
349.  “Third, class arbitration greatly increases risks to 
defendants.”  Id. at 350.  Indeed, as Concepcion concluded, 
“[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class 
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litigation.”  Id.  These differences make it clear why parties, 
to put it bluntly, care so much about whether the agreement to 
arbitrate permits class arbitration.  They also make clear why 
having the right to compel class arbitration is not the same as 
having the right to compel bipolar arbitration.6  We thus part 
ways with our dissenting colleague who believes that the 
“dispositive question here” is whether “it would have been 
futile in 2009 for [Defendants] to move to enforce the 
arbitration clauses.”  By so broadening the dispositive inquiry 
in this case, it is no wonder she concludes that the futility 
exception does not apply.  Had Defendants sought to enforce 
the arbitration clauses in 2009, they would have been, as we 
explain below, forced into class arbitration with near 
certainty.7  Even the dissent begrudgingly acknowledges that 
                                                 
6 We recognize that both Concepcion and Opalinski were 
decided after this case was brought and thus were not 
available to Defendants when they had to decide whether to 
move for bipolar arbitration.  That said, we believe that these 
cases fairly summarize the rather uncontroversial position that 
class arbitration differs greatly from bipolar arbitration.  See 
Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 459 (recognizing that parties who have 
agreed to bipolar arbitration cannot be forced into class 
arbitration because the two procedures are substantively 
distinct); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 
(2002) (“[N]othing in the [FAA] authorizes a court to compel 
arbitration of any issues, or by any parties, that are not 
already covered in the agreement.”).  This was well 
understood in 2009 when the complaint was filed. 
7 As discussed infra, the New Jersey Supreme Court made it 
clear that “it [is] unconscionable for defendants to deprive 
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they “might not have succeeded in getting what they wanted: 
individual arbitration.”  How, then, can we say that 
Defendants waived the right to individual arbitration by 
failing to seek to enforce an arbitration clause which almost 
certainly would have resulted in class arbitration?  We 
believe that the right to individual arbitration is a distinct 
right separate from the right to class arbitration.  We therefore 
hold that – whether or not class arbitration was permissible – 
a court must also determine whether it would have been futile 
to move for bipolar arbitration under the prevailing law.  We 
turn, then, to that question. 
B. 
 To determine whether Defendants’ motion to compel 
bipolar arbitration would have been futile, we must first 
define futility as understood in this context.  Other courts to 
address this issue have concluded that futility does not mean 
something is absolutely impossible; nor does it mean 
something is merely improbable.  See generally Garcia v. 
Wachovia Corp., 699 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2012) (“The 
more lenient unlikely-to-succeed standard . . . would only 
encourage litigants to delay moving to compel arbitration 
until they could ascertain how the case was going in federal 
district court.” (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted)).  Instead, when asking whether arbitration would 
                                                                                                             
[plaintiff] of the mechanism of a class-wide action, whether 
in arbitration or in court litigation.”  Muhammad, 189 N.J. at 
22. 
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have been futile, courts ask whether “it was almost certain 
. . . that a motion to compel arbitration would have been 
denied.”  Id. (emphasis added); see also Miller, 791 F.2d at 
854 (“[A]ny motion to compel arbitration would almost 
certainly have been futile.”); Peterson, 849 F.2d at 466 
(“Because Shearson almost certainly could not have obtained 
an order for arbitration of the Rule 10b-5 claim prior to 
McMahon, it did not waive its right to arbitrate the claim.”).8 
 We agree, which requires us to ask whether a motion 
to compel bipolar arbitration filed by Defendants prior to 
Concepcion was almost certain to fail.  We hold that it was.  
Then-existing New Jersey law prohibited courts from 
compelling bipolar arbitration in a certain subset of adhesive 
consumer contracts.  Muhammad v. Cty. Band of Rehoboth 
Beach, DE, 189 N.J. 1 (2006).  Because we conclude that the 
contracts here fall within the subset of contracts for which 
compelled bipolar arbitration would have been 
unconscionable under Muhammad, we hold that any attempt 
                                                 
8 We see no conflict between the “almost certain to fail” 
standard and the Eighth Circuit’s position that waiver is 
appropriate if “it should have been clear . . . that the 
arbitration agreement was at least arguably enforceable.”  Se. 
Stud & Components, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Design Build Studios, 
LLC, 588 F.3d 963, 967 (8th Cir. 2009).  If an arbitration 
clause is not at least arguably enforceable, it is almost certain 
to fail.  These are, if not essentially the same standard, 
logically parallel. 
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to seek bipolar arbitration in this case prior to Concepcion 
was almost certain to fail. 
 In Muhammad, the New Jersey Supreme Court held 
that “it was unconscionable for defendants to deprive 
Muhammad of the mechanism of a class-wide action, whether 
in arbitration or in court litigation.”  189 N.J. at 22.  This was 
because “[t]he public interest at stake in [the plaintiff’s] 
ability and the ability of her fellow consumers effectively to 
pursue their statutory rights under this State’s consumer 
protection laws overrides the defendants’ right to seek 
enforcement of the class-arbitration bar in their agreement.”  
Id.  Specifically, the court considered “the small amount of 
damages being pursued in this action involving complicated 
financial arrangements and multiple out-of-state entities.”  Id.  
It then went on to note that the small value of each claim – at 
most $600 – would make it difficult to pursue individually, 
even if recovery of attorney’s fees were permitted.  Id. at 21 
(“One may be hard-pressed to find an attorney willing to 
work on a consumer-fraud complaint involving complex 
arrangements . . . when the recovery is so small.”).  
Accordingly, the court concluded – after performing a fact 
intensive inquiry – that in a certain subset of adhesive 
contracts, a consumer cannot be compelled to submit to 
bipolar arbitration.  This was primarily because the court 
concluded that individual plaintiffs were frequently 
discouraged from asserting meritorious claims by the 
relatively high costs inherent in doing so.  Thus, as a policy 
matter, the court concluded that consumers in such situations 
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could not be forbidden from pursuing their claims in a class 
setting.  Id. 
 Three years later in Homa v. American Express Co., 
we also confirmed that this New Jersey policy was not 
preempted by the FAA.  558 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2009).  In 
Homa, a putative class of consumers alleged that American 
Express misrepresented the terms of the rewards program for 
one of its credit cards.  558 F.3d at 227.  Like Muhammad, 
the claims at issue in Homa were small claims that were not 
generally worth litigating on an individual basis.  Id.  The 
District Court in Homa, however, held that despite 
Muhammad, American Express could compel bipolar 
arbitration by enforcing the class arbitration waiver provision 
in its contracts.  Id. at 230-231.  We read Muhammad 
differently and reversed.  First, we noted that the District 
Court placed too much emphasis on language in Muhammad 
explaining that class-arbitration waivers are not per se 
unenforceable.  Id. at 230.  We concluded that this focus on 
the lack of a per se rule inappropriately minimized the 
broader applicability of Muhammad and its conclusion that 
certain contracts barring class arbitration violated New 
Jersey’s public policy against exculpatory clauses.  Id.  
Second, we compared the facts of Homa to those in 
Muhammad and concluded that  
the contract at issue [in Homa] bears the 
hallmarks of a contract of adhesion—it was 
presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, . . . in a 
standardized printed form, without opportunity 
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for the adhering party to negotiate except 
perhaps on a few particulars and, as Appellant’s 
underlying claim implicates less than five 
percent of a cardholder’s overall credit card 
balance, predictably involves a small amount of 
damages . . . .  [Thus,] the District Court should 
have denied the 12(b)(6) motion and concluded 
that, in light of Muhammad, at this stage the 
class-arbitration waiver at issue violates New 
Jersey’s fundamental public policy. 
Id. at 231.  Thus, “we h[e]ld that, if the claims at issue are of 
such a low value as effectively to preclude relief if decided 
individually, then, under Muhammad, . . . the class-arbitration 
waiver is unconscionable.”9  Here, however, because we 
                                                 
9 In a concurring opinion, Judge Weis also discussed some of 
the specific factors that New Jersey courts seemed to focus on 
when determining if a contract is unconscionable.  This list, 
too, makes it clear that one of the key factors is the relatively 
small value of the individual claims: “[m]atters bearing on the 
Court’s appraisal included the lawsuit’s complexity, the 
amount of damages involved, and the availability of 
attorneys’ fees and statutory multipliers.  The size of potential 
damages was considered to be an important consideration and 
was used to limit the holding to ‘low-value’ cases.”  Homa, 
558 F.3d at 233.  He did, however, express some doubt about 
our ability to determine with certainty how the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would rule if confronted with this case, and 
thus explained that the District Court should perform a more 
in depth application of Muhammad on remand.  Id. at 233-34. 
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know the value of the individual claims, we need not require 
the District Court to conduct further inquiry into this issue on 
remand. 
 Applying Homa and Muhammad, we must undertake a 
fact specific inquiry into whether the contracts in this case 
have the same characteristics as those discussed above.  See 
Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 605 A.2d 
681, 687 (N.J. 1992) (“[I]n determining whether to enforce 
the terms of a contract of adhesion, courts have looked not 
only to the take-it-or-leave-it nature or the standardized form 
of the document but also to the subject matter of the contract, 
the parties’ relative bargaining positions, the degree of 
economic compulsion motivating the ‘adhering’ party, and 
the public interests affected by the contract.”).  If so, we can 
confidently conclude that any attempt by the Defendants to 
compel bipolar arbitration – and “deprive [Plaintiffs] of the 
mechanism of a class-wide action, whether in arbitration or in 
court litigation,” Muhammad, 189 N.J. at 22 – was almost 
certain to fail. 
 In doing so, we conclude that the contracts here 
contain the same characteristics as those in Muhammad and 
Homa.  Therefore, a New Jersey court confronted with this 
case in 2009 would almost certainly have found Muhammad 
controlling and would have denied Defendants’ motion to 
compel bipolar arbitration.  Specifically, we highlight three 
key similarities.  First, the value of the individual claims in 
this case are small, between $70 and $350; the claims in 
Muhammad were all for less than $600.  This suggests that it 
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would be, in most cases, impractical to bring an individual 
claim for relief.  See Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 
104, 115 (N.J. 2006) (“Harris has adequate incentive to bring 
her claim as an individual action.  Not only are her damages 
substantial, but the fact that her home is at stake in the 
foreclosure proceeding makes it likely that she would contact 
an attorney.  The same cannot be said of low-value claims 
where individuals have little, if any, incentive to seek out an 
attorney.”).  Second, there is little doubt that these contracts 
are adhesive consumer contracts; they were presented on a 
“take-it-or-leave-it basis, commonly in a standardized printed 
form, without opportunity for the ‘adhering’ party to 
negotiate except perhaps on a few particulars.”  Muhammad, 
189 N.J. at 15.10  Finally, it is likely that here, “without the 
availability of a class-action mechanism, many consumer-
fraud victims may never realize that they may have been 
wronged.”  Id. at 20.  Most consumers would lack the 
necessary motivation to spend time looking into the costs 
associated with filing records in their county.  Because these 
                                                 
10 We recognize that Plaintiffs had the option to augment a 
few specific terms in the contract by, for example, asking for 
a pre-printed Arbitration Endorsement which would have 
required both parties to consent to arbitration.  Based on the 
evidence presented to the District Court, this option was 
rarely, if ever, requested.  Nonetheless, the ability to exercise 
this option in a real estate closing hardly provides support for 
the position that this is anything but a contract of adhesion.  
Indeed, Muhammad recognized that the ability to negotiate 
“on a few particulars” does not prevent a contract from being 
adhesive.  189 N.J. at 15. 
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similarities all evidence the same unconscionability concerns 
highlighted in Muhammad, we hold that any attempt by 
Defendants to compel bipolar arbitration prior to Concepcion 
would almost certainly have failed.11 
 Indeed, even the Plaintiffs at one point argued that 
under Muhammad, the contracts here would be 
unconscionable if read to prohibit class arbitration and 
compel bipolar arbitration.  In a section of Plaintiffs’ response 
to Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration that is aptly titled 
“Under New Jersey Law Chosen by Defendants, a 
Requirement of Individual Arbitration of Plaintiffs’ Claims 
Would be Unconscionable,” the Plaintiffs explained that 
“[t]he factors identified by the Court in Muhammad as 
rendering the class action ban unconscionable are present 
here to the extent Defendants invoke their arbitration clause 
solely in order to prohibit any class action.”  Pl.’s Br. in Opp. 
                                                 
11 While we readily acknowledge the concerns which the New 
Jersey Supreme Court has suggested necessitate a finding of 
procedural unconscionability, we need not opine on the public 
policy considerations inherent in deciding whether to enforce 
similar arbitration clauses because Congress has already made 
this difficult decision.  As the Supreme Court made clear in 
Concepcion, “[t]he principle purpose of the FAA is to ensure 
that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to 
their terms.”  563 U.S. at 344.  And because the Supreme 
Court has decided that the FAA preempts contrary state law, 
we need not address this issue further. 
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to Joint Mot. to Stay, ECF No. 221 at *39. 12  While not 
giving this inconsistency any real weight, we simply note its 
existence. 
                                                 
12 This further highlights the key error the dissent makes 
when suggesting that the lack of a class arbitration waiver 
meaningfully distinguishes this case from Muhammad.  The 
dissent argues that in our case, it is unlikely that a New Jersey 
court would have held the arbitration clauses unconscionable 
because the clauses could have been read to permit class 
arbitration (due to their lack of a class-arbitration waiver).  
While this is true, the right question to ask when assessing 
futility here is not whether the arbitration clauses, as a whole, 
would have been unconscionable.  The question is whether a 
motion to compel bipolar arbitration would have been futile 
prior to Concepcion.  Indeed, practically speaking, the 
dissent’s approach to futility would lead to an absurd outcome 
in this case.  In order to prevent waiver of Defendants’ now-
existing right to compel bipolar arbitration, Defendants’ 
lawyers would have had to seek to enforce an arbitration 
agreement that they knew – or should have known – would 
almost certainly be read to allow Plaintiffs to arbitrate as a 
class.  Accordingly, had they pursued arbitration in 2009, 
they would have been exposing their clients to the very real 
possibility that a multi-million dollar class action case would 
be decided by an arbitral panel; a procedural outcome far less 
preferable for Defendants than a class action in federal court.  
See generally Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350 (“Arbitration is 
poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation.” ); 
Jonathan R. Bunch, To Be Announced: Silence from the 
United States Supreme Court and Disagreement Among 
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IV. 
 We next address two minor issues.  First, having 
concluded that the futility exception applies, we go on to 
excuse the pre-Concepcion delay and analyze the post-
Concepcion delay under Hoxworth.  Second, we consider the 
scope of the arbitration clauses here and conclude that their 
breadth makes it clear they encompass the New Jersey 
Consumer Fraud Act (NJCFA) claims that are contested on 
appeal. 
A. 
 Because any attempt to compel bipolar arbitration in 
this case prior to Concepcion was almost certain to fail, we 
will disregard Defendants’ pre-Concepcion delay13 when 
                                                                                                             
Lower Courts Suggest an Uncertain Future for Class-Wide 
Arbitration, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 259, 272 (2004) (explaining 
that class arbitration often seems to “bring[] the burdens of 
litigation into the arbitral forum” without bringing any of the 
benefits along with it).  It would be a cruel joke to tell 
Defendants that they waived their right to bipolar arbitration 
by not seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement that would 
have almost certainly led to class arbitration.   
13 The length of the delay itself – if excused under the futility 
exception – is not relevant to our inquiry.  Yet even were we 
to consider it, we note that delays of a similar length have 
been excused by the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits.  See 
Benoay v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 805 F.2d 1437, 1440 
(11th Cir. 1986) (“Despite the fact that Bache and Stark’s 
motion to compel arbitration was made two and one-half 
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determining whether waiver is appropriate.  See Miller, 791 
F.2d at 854 (“Subsequent to [the relevant change in the law], 
appellees delayed only two and a half months in making their 
request.  Much of that delay is attributable to consolidation of 
the cases and appellant’s filing of an amended complaint.  In 
light of these facts, we find no waiver of the right to 
arbitrate.”).14  Plaintiffs also do not claim that they suffered 
any additional unfair prejudice apart from the costs associated 
with maintaining and prosecuting this case prior to 
Concepcion.  See generally Fisher, 791 F.2d at 698 (“The 
Arbitration Act requires district courts to compel arbitration 
even where the result would be the possibly inefficient 
maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums.”).15 
                                                                                                             
years after initiation of the civil action, we conclude that the 
motion was timely in light of a change in law affecting the 
parties’ rights.”); Nesslage v. York Sec., Inc., 823 F.2d 231, 
234 (8th Cir. 1987) (excusing two year delay). 
14 We also believe that our decision to excuse the delay and 
its resulting expense to Plaintiffs here is supported by the 
“‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.’”  Concepcion, 
563 U.S. at 339 (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24).  
We therefore leave it to courts in future cases to decide 
whether and how to apply futility outside of the arbitration 
context. 
15 In In re California Title Insurance Antitrust Litigation, No. 
CIV. 08-1341, 2011 WL 2566449 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2011),  
a case practically identical to ours, Judge White concluded 
that the delay resulting from the belated invocation of 
arbitration as a defense was not unfairly prejudicial despite 
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 Because we fully excused the pre-Concepcion delay, 
we consider only whether Defendants’ approximately three-
month delay between April 27, 2011 (when Concepcion was 
decided) and August 1, 2011 (when Defendants filed their 
motion to compel arbitration) was prejudicial to Plaintiffs.  In 
doing so, we look to the Hoxworth factors outlined supra for 
guidance and conclude that waiver would be inappropriate for 
three reasons.  First, Defendants notified Plaintiffs on June 8, 
2011 – just over a month after Concepcion was decided – that 
they were demanding bipolar arbitration.  This promptly put 
Plaintiffs on notice that a motion for arbitration was coming if 
the demand was rejected.  Second, only three months passed 
                                                                                                             
the fact that the case had been going on for over three years.  
Specifically, he noted, “[t]here is nothing in the record to 
support Plaintiffs’ conclusory contention that granting the 
motion to compel arbitration would unfairly prejudice 
Plaintiffs.”  Id. at *3 (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted).  He then noted that the trial date was still over a 
year away and that only limited substantive discovery had 
taken place.  We too are not convinced by Plaintiffs’ 
allegations of prejudice here and, in light of the FAA’s strong 
policy favoring arbitration, reject the argument that the 
litigation costs associated with a delay in this case can alone 
qualify as sufficient unfair prejudice to prevent application of 
the futility exception.  Cf. Martin v. Yasuda, No. 15-55696, 
slip op. at *13 (9th Cir. July 21, 2016) (“A determination of 
whether ‘the right to compel arbitration has been waived must 
be conducted in light of the strong federal policy favoring 
enforcement of arbitration agreements.’” (quoting Fisher, 791 
F.2d at 694)). 
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between the accretion of the right and Defendant’s motion to 
compel arbitration.  This is not an unreasonable amount of 
time.  Third, virtually no substantive or procedural litigation 
occurred during this delay.  Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 926-27.16 
B. 
 Finally, we note that the broad scope of the arbitration 
clauses here make it clear that we do not need to reach the 
viability of Plaintiffs’ NJCFA claims.17  The 1987 Owner’s 
Policy states that “arbitration shall decide any matter in 
                                                 
16 We also summarily reject Plaintiffs’ argument that the 
Arbitration Endorsement was a mandatory addendum to every 
title insurance contract at issue here.  Not only are the District 
Court’s findings on this issue compelling, but we are also 
reviewing the court’s factual findings for clear error, despite 
Plaintiffs attempt to dress up their argument as a matter of 
law by suggesting that the District Court ignored probative 
evidence.  See N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 
52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995).  The District Court here 
properly considered and weighed the competing evidence and 
found the Defendants’ position more compelling.  This was 
not clearly erroneous. 
17 The scope of an arbitration clause is decided by the court 
absent clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed 
to submit this issue to the arbitrator.  First Options of 
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); 
CardioNet, Inc. v. Cigna Health Corp., 751 F.3d 165, 171 (3d 
Cir. 2014).  We find no language in the contracts suggesting 
an intent that this issue be submitted to the arbitrator. 
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dispute between you and the Company,” while the 1992 Loan 
Policy states that “[a]rbitrable matters include, but are not 
limited, to any controversy or claim between the company 
and the insured arising out of or relating to the policy . . . .”  
JA 33.  As we held in CardioNet, when the plain language of 
an arbitration clause is clear, it controls.  751 F.3d at 173.  We 
went further, however, and also concluded that if the 
language of the contract is ambiguous, “the presumption of 
arbitrability applies” because “[w]e must resolve ‘any doubts 
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues . . . in favor of 
arbitration.’”  Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-
25).  Thus, we have no doubt that the NJCFA claims raised 
here are subject to arbitration. 
V. 
 For the reasons previously articulated, we will remand 
this case to the District Court with instructions to compel 
bipolar arbitration of Plaintiffs’ arbitrable claims in 
accordance with the District Court’s May 14, 2015, order and 
this opinion. 
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Chassen v. Fidelity National Financial, Inc. et al. 
No. 15-3789 
          
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 The majority’s opinion is flawed for a clear and 
obvious reason: it relies on caselaw that has no application 
here. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.  
 
 In Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court held that “the presence of the 
class-arbitration waiver in Muhammad’s consumer arbitration 
agreement render[ed] that agreement unconscionable.” 912 
A.2d 88, 100 (N.J. 2006). Yet, despite the lack of a class 
arbitration waiver in the arbitration clauses here, the majority 
holds that a New Jersey court in 2009, at the outset of this 
case, would have found Muhammad controlling here. I reject 
that view, and urge you to read Muhammad and the actual 
arbitration clauses at issue here. Doing so will lead inexorably 
to one conclusion: this case is not Muhammad, and a motion 
by the Defendants in 2009 to compel arbitration thus would 
have been anything but futile. Moreover, the majority has 
expanded the concept of futility beyond what we as a court 
should recognize.        
 
 In Muhammad, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
considered whether to compel arbitration under an arbitration 
agreement in a payday loan contract that in no uncertain 
terms prohibited class arbitration. Specifically, in multiple 
places, the agreement required Muhammad to resolve all 
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disputes related to her payday loan transaction “by binding 
individual (and not class) arbitration.” Id. at 92. The court 
held these waivers unconscionable under New Jersey law. 
According to the court, by forcing Muhammad to waive class 
arbitration in her case, which involved a small amount of 
damages, the arbitration agreement operated as an 
exculpatory clause, effectively releasing the lender from 
liability for possible statutory violations. See id. at 99–101. 
 
 Unsurprisingly, then, courts applying New Jersey law 
considered Muhammad to be relevant only when analyzing 
the unconscionability of class arbitration waivers. In Homa v. 
American Express Co., for example, we examined an 
arbitration provision in a consumer agreement that required 
all claims to “be arbitrated on an individual basis . . . [with] 
no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated [as] a 
class action.” 558 F.3d 225, 227 (3d Cir. 2009). After 
comparing this class arbitration waiver to the “similar class-
arbitration waiver” at issue in Muhammad, we deemed it 
unconscionable under New Jersey law. Id. at 230–31; see 
also, e.g., Cohen v. Chase Bank, N.A., 679 F. Supp. 2d 582, 
595 (D.N.J. 2010) (holding that the “the present class-action 
waiver” is unconscionable under Muhammad); Davis v. Dell, 
Inc., No. 07-630 (RBK), 2008 WL 3843837, at *4 (D.N.J. 
Aug. 15, 2008) (“This Court finds that this case is 
distinguishable from Muhammad, and the class action waiver 
does not act as an unconscionable exculpatory clause.”). 
 
 Here, the arbitration clauses—which are situated in the 
Loan Policies and the Owners’ Policies—lack any sort of 
class arbitration waiver. The Loan Policies provide:  
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Unless prohibited by applicable law, either the 
Company or the insured may demand 
arbitration pursuant to the Title Insurance 
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association. Arbitrable matters may include, 
but are not limited to, any controversy or claim 
between the Company and the insured arising 
out of or relating to this policy, any service of 
the Company in connection with its issuance or 
the breach of a policy provision or other 
obligation. All arbitrable matters when the 
Amount of Insurance is $1,000,000 or less shall 
be arbitrated at the option of either the 
Company or the insured. All arbitrable matters 
when the Amount of Insurance is in excess of 
$1,000,000 shall be arbitrated only when agreed 
to by both the Company and the insured. 
Arbitration pursuant to this policy, and under 
the Rules in effect on the date the demand for 
arbitration is made or, at the option of the 
insured, the Rules in effect at Date of Policy, 
shall be binding upon the parties.  
 
J.A. 3981. And the Owners’ Policies provide: “If it is 
permitted in your state, you or the Company may 
demand arbitration. The arbitration shall be binding on 
both you and the Company. The arbitration shall 
decide any matter in dispute between you and the 
Company.” J.A. 3997. These clauses, quite obviously, 
do not even mention class arbitration, let alone outright 
prohibit it. If the Defendants had sought individual 
arbitration at the outset of the case, this silence might 
have been interpreted to mean that the parties simply 
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did not contemplate class arbitration. Or it might have 
been construed as permitting class arbitration.1 Surely, 
it would not have been futile for them to move to 
enforce these clauses at that time.   
 
 Because the arbitration clauses here sit far 
outside the reach of Muhammad, as they are devoid of 
a class arbitration waiver, “‘it should have been clear 
to the [Defendants in 2009] that the arbitration 
agreement[s] w[ere] at least arguably enforceable.’” 
Garcia v. Wachovia Corp., 699 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th 
Cir. 2012) (quoting Se. Stud & Components, Inc. v. 
Am. Eagle Design Build Studios, LLC, 588 F.3d 963, 
967 (8th Cir. 2009)). Indeed, the Defendants have cited 
not one case—let alone any controlling precedent in 
2009—in which a court applied Muhammad and held 
as unconscionable an arbitration agreement that 
contained no class arbitration waiver or prohibition. 
See id. (“[A]bsent controlling . . . precedent 
foreclosing a right to arbitrate, a motion to compel 
arbitration will almost never be futile.”).  
 
 The majority contends that it does not matter 
that the arbitration clauses here lacked class arbitration 
                                              
1 The majority claims that, had the Defendants moved to 
enforce the arbitration clauses in 2009, “they would have 
been . . . forced into class arbitration with near certainty.” 
Majority Op. 18. I disagree. The majority bases that view on 
the flawed premise that these arbitration clauses implicated 
Muhammad. There simply is no class arbitration bar that 
would have been held unconscionable, and the clauses at 
issue could have been interpreted either way.  
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waivers. See Majority Op. 26 n.12. According to the 
majority, regardless of whether these clauses contained 
class arbitration waivers, given Muhammad, it would 
have been futile in 2009 for the Defendants to seek 
individual arbitration. It concludes that “a New Jersey 
court confronted with this case in 2009 would almost 
certainly have found Muhammad controlling and 
would have denied Defendants’ motion to compel 
[individual] arbitration.” Id. at 24.    
  
 That conclusion is simply wrong. The 
majority’s analysis here fails to refer back to its own 
characterization of Muhammad as being animated by 
the explicit “class-arbitration bar,” or “class-arbitration 
waiver,” at issue there. Majority Op. 21, 22. This 
omission renders its conclusion not only arbitrary, but 
wrong. 
 
 Furthermore, contrary to the majority’s 
position, the futility inquiry is not about disregarding 
the actual arbitration clauses at issue and asking the 
question—divorced from the arbitration clauses 
themselves—of whether “it would have been futile to 
move for [individual] arbitration under [Muhammad].” 
Id. at 19. No circuit court has ever framed the inquiry 
this way, and for good reason. As noted above, the 
futility inquiry sensibly focuses on the enforceability 
of the actual arbitration clauses—that is, would it 
have been futile in 2009 for the Defendants to move to 
enforce these clauses? See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, NA, 704 F.3d 712, 719 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(“Our [futility] analysis begins with the [arbitration 
agreement] between Wells Fargo and the class 
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members.”); Fisher v. A.G. Becker Paribas Inc., 791 
F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Until the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Byrd, the arbitration agreement in 
this case was unenforceable.”).2 Here, the answer is 
no.   
 
 But even if we were to pretend that these 
clauses contained class arbitration waivers so as to 
implicate Muhammad, a motion to compel individual 
arbitration in 2009 would have been far from futile. In 
Muhammad, the New Jersey Supreme Court did not 
hold that class arbitration waivers were “per se” 
unconscionable—far from it. 912 A.2d at 101. Rather, 
in holding that particular class arbitration waiver 
unconscionable, it articulated a “multi-factor analysis,” 
one that necessitated a “fact-sensitive examination,” 
for courts to apply when “evaluat[ing] claims of 
unconscionability.” Id. at 97. A court must first 
determine whether the class arbitration waiver was part 
of a contract of adhesion. Id. at 96–97. If so, it must 
next consider (1) “the subject matter of the contract”; 
(2) “the parties’ relative bargaining positions”; (3) “the 
degree of economic compulsion motivating the 
adhering party”; and (4) “the public interests affected 
by the contract.” Id. at 97 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
                                              
2 The majority itself quotes this language from Fisher, see 
Majority Op. 14, but then analyzes the futility issue here in a 
manner totally divorced from the actual language of the 
arbitration clauses.   
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 So, if we were to pretend Muhammad applied 
here, the Defendants could have easily argued that 
these arbitration clauses were not unconscionable. 
Most notably, they could have shown that these 
clauses were not part of contracts of adhesion, which 
would have obviated the need for the court to even 
consider the remaining factors. See id. (“The 
determination that a contract is one of adhesion . . . is 
the beginning, not the end, of the inquiry . . . .” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). As noted by the 
majority in a footnote, the Plaintiffs “had the option” 
to “ask[] for a pre-printed Arbitration Endorsement 
which would have required both parties to consent to 
arbitration.” Majority Op. 25 n.10. In other words, the 
Plaintiffs could have avoided being forced into 
arbitration. The Defendants thus could have 
established that these contracts were not ones of 
adhesion because the very terms at issue—the 
arbitration clauses—were optional, i.e., they were not 
“presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.” Muhammad, 
912 A.2d at 96; see also Nino v. Jewelry Exchange, 
Inc., 609 F.3d 191, 201 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that an 
arbitration agreement was part of a contract of 
adhesion and thus procedurally unconscionable 
because the defendant “presented the arbitration 
agreement to [the plaintiff] for signature on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
How, then, could it possibly have been futile in light of 
Muhammad for the Defendants to move to compel 
individual arbitration in 2009? I am baffled by the 
majority’s conclusion that “there is little doubt” that 
the arbitration clauses at issue here were part of 
contracts of adhesion. Majority Op. 25.  
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 The Defendants’ inaction in 2009, and their 
about-face to seek arbitration in 2011, were no doubt 
driven by litigation tactics to derail the court 
proceedings. At the outset of the case, they realized 
that moving to compel individual arbitration under the 
arbitration clauses here, which were silent as to class 
arbitration, could have exposed them to class 
arbitration—a situation they admitted they “would 
never ever open [themselves] up for.” Oral Arg. Tr. 
20:37–41, July 14, 2016. That prospect then became 
unlikely when the Court decided Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds International Corp. and rejected the idea 
that “the parties’ mere silence on the issue of class-
action arbitration constitutes consent to resolve their 
disputes in class proceedings.” 559 U.S. 662, 687 
(2010). Fueled by Stolt-Nielsen, they then seized the 
opportunity to cloak their delay under the veil of 
futility ostensibly afforded to them by AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). But the 
previous uncertainty as to class arbitration does not 
mean that it would have been futile in 2009 for them to 
move to enforce the arbitration clauses, which is the 
dispositive question here. It just means that they might 
not have succeeded in getting what they wanted: 
individual arbitration.   
 
 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from 
the majority’s opinion. It would have been far from 
futile for the Defendants to move to enforce these 
arbitration clauses in 2009. We should therefore 
consider only whether their belated attempt to do so 
prejudiced the Plaintiffs under the factors from 
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Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 980 F.2d 
912 (3d Cir. 1992). This analysis would undoubtedly 
lead to our finding that the Plaintiffs were prejudiced 
such that the Defendants waived their right to arbitrate. 
The Defendants did not just warm the bench for two 
and a half years before moving to compel arbitration. 
During that time, they repeatedly contested the merits 
of the Plaintiffs’ claims, engaged in substantial non-
merits litigation, and participated in extensive 
discovery that cost the Plaintiffs over $57,000. Under 
Hoxworth, this would not even be a close call. See id. 
at 925–26 (finding prejudice where the defendants 
waited eleven months to seek arbitration, participated 
in numerous pretrial proceedings, filed motions 
challenging the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, and 
took depositions).    
 
